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THE CASE FOR NO-FAULT MEDICAL LIABILITY
PAUL C. WEILER*
INTRODUCTION'
For the last two decades, medical malpractice litigation has
been the focal point of the tort reform debate. Fueled by the first
malpractice insurance "crisis" of the mid-1970s, a number of state
legislatures adopted a variety of constraints on the common-law tort
system for negligent medical injuries: offsets of collateral source
payments, 2 caps on pain and suffering damages' and contingent
legal fees,4 panels to screen the merits of claims before suit or trial,5
and so on. After a lull in the late 1970s and early 1980s, doctors
were again caught up in a broader spiral of tort liability claims and
insurance premiums in the mid-1980s. Legislatures responded with
* Henry J. Friendly Professor of Law, Harvard University. M.A., Toronto; LL.M.,
Harvard; LL.D., Victoria.
1. This Article restates an argument I first developed in my book, PAUL C. WEILER,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1991) [hereinafter WEILER I]. That book, in turn,
drew upon two projects that I had been working on for the previous five years. One
project, the Harvard Medical Practice Study in New York, was an empirical investigation
of all aspects of medical injury and malpractice litigation, a study for which I was the
principal legal investigator. The nature and results of the Harvard Study are detailed in
PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE (1993) [hereinafter WEILER II]. In
addition to other sources of empirical data cited specifically in this Article, therefore,
WEILER II should be consulted generally for the key findings of the Harvard Study. The
second project was the American Law Institute's comprehensive study of tort litigation
and tort reform, including medical malpractice law, for which I served as Chief Reporter
(and on which three of my colleagues in this Symposium-Jeffrey O'Connell, Robert
Rabin, and Gary Schwartz-played major roles). The analysis and proposals of the ALI
Study are contained in a two-volume report to the ALI. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY (1991)
[hereinafter ALI REPORT]. These three volumes contain detailed documentation of, and
references for, the bulk of the claims I am making here. Needless to say, I am greatly
indebted to my partners in both those projects for their help in shaping my thoughts on
this topic.
2. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42 (West Supp. 1990); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 26.1-14-11 (1989); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-19-34 (1984).
3. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN.
§ 21-3-11 (1987); see also WEILER I, supra note 1, at 55-56.
4. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6865 (1989); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146
(West 1990); see also WEILER I, supra note 1, at 62-64.
5. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1989) (creating an
arbitration procedure for the initial determination of health care malpractice claims);
WEILER I, supra note 1, at 29 & nn. 41-42.
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more of the same,6 this time often extending the benefit of such
legal protections against litigation to other defendants such as prod-
uct manufacturers. That second burst of state legislative activity was
again followed by a plateauing of malpractice claims and premiums.
In the early 1990s, however, the federal government, particularly
the Bush administration and its supporters in Congress, took up the
cause of medical malpractice reform, rather than focusing simply on
products liability. Their stated mission was somewhat different-re-
lieving the nation's broader crisis of rising health care costs and pre-
miums-but the means were the same: a host of constraints upon
patients seeking to sue health care providers. 7
From a practical empirical perspective, this legislative preoccu-
pation with medical malpractice seems curious. The total cost of
malpractice insurance-the most generous estimate is about $9 bil-
lion-is only a tiny fraction of the nation's $130 billion in tort liabil-
ity expenditures (of which $90 billion goes toward motor vehicle
accident insurance alone), and of its $190 billion total liability bill
(when one adds the $60 billion of annual workers' compensation
costs).' And the idea that containing medical liability costs will
make any appreciable dent in health care costs is absurd. A mere
two months' growth in our monstrous $840 billion health care bill9
would exceed the savings made from total elimination of malprac-
tice premiums.o
6. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (1989) (setting a $350,000
limit on non-economic damages awarded in personal injury actions).
7. See, e.g., William Winkenwerder, Health-Care Plans: Mhich One Will lVork?, ATLANTA
CONST., Oct. 25, 1992, at H4 (characterizing then-President Bush's plan as an "aggres-
sive" one, requiring caps on punitive damages and reducing incentives for trial lawyers
to sue).
8. For a compilation of tort-liability expenditures in 1991, see ROBERT W. STURGIS,
TORT COST TRENDS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 1 (Tillinghast 1992). See also John
F. Burton, Jr., Workers' Compensation Costs in 1991, in 5 JOHN BURTON'S WORKERS' COM-
PENSATION MONITOR 1 (1992) (documenting workers' compensation expenditures in
1991). A recent study performed by the National Insurance Consumer organization re-
ported that doctors and hospitals paid almost $4.9 billion in insurance premiums in
1991, compared with $2.7 billion in 1985. See Jonathan M. Moses, Mlalpractice Claims,
WALL. ST. J., Mar. 25, 1993, at B5. To these premiums paid by providers one should
add another $2 to $3 billion for the cost of self-insurance by larger health care
organizations.
9. See Moses, supra note 8, at B5.
10. I realize that there is an additional cost of liability to the health care system-the
expense of "defensive" medicine. The best estimate is that these additional costs of
litigation are roughly twice the cost of direct insurance, bringing the total liability bur-
den to about $27 billion; that is still only 3% or so of our total health care costs. For
reasons I will detail later, it is fallacious to assume that, on balance, defensive medicine
adds to, rather than reduces, the total health care bill. See infra text following note 101.
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There is, of course, a political explanation for this legislative
preoccupation. The principal targets of malpractice litigation are
not faceless corporations, such as product manufacturers, but real,
live doctors. And unlike motor vehicle litigation where the nominal
defendants are also real people, a malpractice suit challenges the
professional performance, reputation, and identity of a doctor or
nurse or other health care provider. The emotional trauma of hav-
ing to defend against what often turn out to be misguided malprac-
tice claims, together with the financial trauma of occasional jumps in
their malpractice premiums, periodically sends doctors to state
capitals-and now the nation's capital-for relief. Because both leg-
islators and voters can more readily empathize with the plight of
their family doctor than, for example, drug manufacturers or asbes-
tos producers, such statutory relief has regularly been forthcoming.
There is an unhappy consequence of this political equation that
lines family doctors up against trial lawyers: legislative relief is ex-
tended just to doctors, not to injured patients. Perhaps in a kinder,
gentler America, we will "sue each other less and care for each other
more" (to quote President Bush)." Such exhortations by the for-
mer President, though, are of little consolation to a patient who has
been crippled for life because a surgeon's scalpel slipped at the op-
erating table. These human tragedies are vividly displayed in the
atmosphere of the courtroom, perhaps exerting too great an influ-
ence in that forum. But the reality of personal injury tends to get
lost from view in the legislative chamber, with unfortunate conse-
quences for the orientation of the typical tort-reform package.
Such a pattern is not inevitable. The response to the current
refrain that we have too much misguided malpractice liability is not
necessarily to produce less of the same kind of liability. It may be
better to produce even more of a very different brand of liability-
no-fault medical liability.
With no-fault workers' compensation as a historical model, and
with different versions of no-fault motor vehicle compensation
emerging on the scene in the early 1970s, it was natural that the idea
of no-fault medical compensation would also be floated in the de-
bates about the malpractice crisis of the mid-1970s."2 This idea was
11. Throughout his unsuccessful re-election campaign in 1992, President Bush reit-
erated a theme attacking our "crazy" legal system, and exhorting the public to "sue each
other less and care for each other more." See, e.g., Ruth Rendon, Lawyer-Bashing by Bush
Gets Man a Second Shot at Lawsuit, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 27, 1992, at Al.
12. For early arguments in support of a no-fault medical malpractice insurance sys-
tem, see Clark C. Havighurst & Laurence R. Tancredi, ",edical Adversity Insurance"-,
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quickly rejected, '3 not so much because of opposition from trial law-
yers as from fears of doctors that this system would be unworkable
or, even if no-fault did work, that it would be far too expensive.
That initial rejection of no-fault was rendered at a time when
malpractice claims were being filed at an annual rate of one per
thirty-five doctors, and total premiums were $1 billion annually.' 4
Now that claims are being filed at an annual rate of more than one
per ten doctors, and premiums have reached the $9 billion level,' 5
doctors and politicians are taking a serious second look at this con-
cept, especially in the more litigious regions and specialties. Two
states-Virginia and Florida-have already adopted narrow versions
of no-fault liability for certain brain-damaged baby cases, and two
other states-New York and North Carolina-are now considering
broader programs for obstetrical injuries."l Three countries-Swe-
den, Finland and New Zealand, the latter as part of its broader acci-
dent compensation plan' 7-have already adopted across-the-board
no-fault medical compensation programs," and a number of
others-for example, Great Britain and Canada-are actively con-
No-Fault Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 613 INS. L.J. 69 (1974); Jef-
frey O'Connell, No-Fault Insurance for Injuries Arising from Medical Treatment: A Proposal for
Elective Coverage, 24 EMORY L.J. 21 (1975); Note, Comparative Approaches to Liabilityfor Med-
ical Maloccurrences, 84 YALE L.J. 1141, 1158-60 (1975) (describing no-fault legislation in-
troduced in Congress in 1975 by Senators Inouye and Kennedy).
13. See, e.g., Frank J. Vandall, Applying Strict Liability to Professionals: Economic and Legal
Analysis, 59 IND. L.J. 25, 62 (1983).
14. WEILER I, supra note 1, at 2-3 & n.6.
15. Id.
16. See Julian D. Bobbitt, Jr. et al., North Carolina's Proposed Birth-Related Neurological
Impairment Act: A Provocative Alternative, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 837 (1991) (describing
both the existing Virginia and Florida "bad baby" compensation programs, and the pro-
posed version in North Carolina); Across the USA: News from Every State, USA TODAY, Mar.
15, 1993, at 8A ("A $250 tax paid by doctors and hospitals on the birth of every baby in
[New York] is being considered by Gov. Cuomo to pay for a new system to compensate
parents whose children are injured at birth.").
17. For descriptions of the New Zealand Accident Compensation scheme before and
after legislative amendments in 1992, see Richard S. Miller, The Future of New Zealand's
Accident Compensation Scheme, 11 U. HAW. L. REV. 1 (1989); Richard S. Miller, An Analysis
and Critique of the 1992 Changes to New Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L.
REV. 1070 (1993).
18. For descriptions of existing foreign medical accident compensation programs,
see generally Diana Brahams, No Fault Compensation Finnish Style, THE LANCET, Sept. 24,
1988, at 733 (on Finland); Walter Gellhorn, Medical .lalpractice Litigation (U.S. )-Medical
Mishap Compensation (A.Z.), 73 CORNELL L. REV. 170 (1988) (on New Zealand); Carl
Oldertz, Security Insurance, Patient Insurance, and Pharmaceutical Insurance in Sweden, 34 AM.
J. COMP. L. 635 (1986); MARILYNN M. ROSENTHAL, DEALING WITH MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
THE BRITISH AND SWEDISH EXPERIENCE 174-86 (1988).
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sidering this same model.' 9 It is at least thinkable, then, that this
country will embrace no-fault as a response to a third malpractice
crisis that may well emerge in the mid-1990s.
I. HIGHLIGHTS AND LOWLIGHTS OF THE CURRENT MALPRACTICE
REGIME
As I will explain in detail later in this Article, no-fault is not a
magic wand that will usher in an idyllic realm of medical liability.
The practical concerns that diverted political attention away from
this model are real. Through careful program design, these con-
cerns can be ameliorated, but not eliminated. Nevertheless, in
choosing among programmatic alternatives, the issue is not whether
one proposal is ideal, viewed just by itself. Rather, the concern is
whether a particular proposal is better than the alternatives, espe-
cially the status quo. Not only has medical malpractice been the
most reformed part of our tort litigation system, it has also been the
most heavily researched. The most wide-ranging investigation was
the Harvard Medical Practice Study in New York, of which I was the
original architect.2 ° The following are among the key findings of
the Harvard Study and other empirical research about the actual
performance of malpractice litigation, for better or for worse.
Malpractice litigation has undergone an apparently explosive
increase over the last three decades-from approximately one claim
per 100 doctors a year in the late 1950s to more than ten claims per
100 doctors in the early 1990s.2 But the major reason why there
are so many legal claims is that there are so many medical (or ia-
trogenic)2 2 injuries: one disabling injury for every 25 hospitaliza-
tions, with one in four injuries due to provider negligence.23 If one
compares the current level of litigation, not to the rate thirty years
ago, but to the risk of negligent injuries occurring right now, it turns
out that there are many more torts occurring in the medical care
system than tort claims being filed-let alone being paid-in the
legal system. In New York, for example, a state with one of the
highest malpractice litigation rates in the nation, we found that
19. See BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, No-FAULT COMPENSATION IN HEALTH CARE
(1987) (Great Britain); ROBERT S. PRICHARD, LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION IN HEALTH
CARE (1990) (Canada).
20. See supra note 1.
21. WEILER II, supra note 1, at 4.
22. An iatrogenic disorder is an unexpected or avoidable adverse event, as opposed
to an inevitable or anticipated traumatic byproduct of necessary treatment.
23. WEILER II, supra note 1, at 137.
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there was only one malpractice claim paid for every three serious,
negligently inflicted, medical injuries that could be identified. 4
A major source of this litigation gap is that most injured pa-
tients do not themselves realize that their current disability is due to
provider negligence; rather, most attribute their illness to the condi-
tion that originally brought them to a doctor or a hospital. 25 In-
deed, in New York we found that both the most serious losses and
the bulk of the uncompensated losses were suffered by patients who
had been negligently injured, notwithstanding the formal promise of
our fault-based tort system.26 The other side of the coin is that most
of the malpractice claims are filed for the wrong cases: there was no
negligence in the treatment-and sometimes not even an injury. 7
The information gap faced by most patients, wondering whether
their condition provides any reason even to consult a lawyer, also
hampers lawyers when they have to decide whether to file a claim on
the basis of what their clients have been able to tell them.
It is true that the process of litigation and discovery does a re-
markably good job of sifting the good claims from the bad. It pays
the vast majority of valid cases and rejects the vast majority of inva-
lid cases by either paying no money, or paying only a fraction of the
dollar amounts paid to good claims. 2' But the price of this litigation
process is the considerable distress inflicted on doctors whose pro-
fessional care and competence are subjected to legal examination,
and the indignation felt by many doctors when their opponents real-
ize the charge was unfounded and simply drop the matter.
24. See id. at 139.
25. A recent RAND study surveyed a nationwide sample of families to determine the
incidence and causes of, and reactions to, accidental injuries. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET
AL., COMPENSATION OF ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES (RAND Institute for
Civil Justice 1991). Respondents only attributed 1% of their total reported injuries to
medical treatment. Id. at 31. This ratio is far smaller than the population-wide estimates
of medical injuries derived from direct reviews of medical records of hospitalized pa-
tients in New York and California. See WEILER II, supra note 1, at 69-70.
26. See WEILER II, supra note 1, at 72-73.
27. Id. at 71.
28. See generally Frederick W. Cheney et al., Standard of Care and Anesthesia Liability, 261
JAMA 1599 (1989) (finding that, for anesthesia-related injuries, there is a high
probability of recovery if care was substandard, but still a moderate probability if care
was appropriate); Henry S. Farber & MichelleJ. White, Medical Malpractice: An Empirical
Examination of the Litigation Process, 22 RAND J. ECON. 199 (1991) (concluding that, in a
single hospital study, quality of care is an extremely important determinant of liability);
Mark I. Taragin et al., The Influence of Standard of Care and Severity of Injuiy on the Resolution
of Medical Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 780 (1992) (finding that defen-
sibility of the case, rather than severity of the injury, predominantly influences whether
any payment is made).
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Contrary to the usual lament of tort defendants, though, doc-
tors do fare quite well in the ten percent or so of cases in which a
patient does press the matter on to trial. Patients win only one-third
ofjury verdicts, a much lower percentage than plaintiffs in products
liability or motor vehicle cases. 29 Indeed, the one in-depth study of
this issue found that doctors rarely lose a case they should win, but
win a significantly high proportion of cases their own insurers think
they should lose, because juries often bend over backwards to make
sure they are not unfairly stigmatizing a doctor with a malpractice
verdict.3 0
Nevertheless, if a jury is convinced that there was negligent
treatment, it tends to render very large damage awards. The aver-
age malpractice verdict is three times the size of motor vehicle ver-
dicts, and twice the size of products and governmental liability
verdicts, after adjusting for the age of the victim and severity of in-
jury.3 1 With the ability to use subjective damage categories such as
pain and suffering-not to mention explicitly punitive damages-ju-
ries can register their moral condemnation of truly substandard care
with truly breathtaking awards, in some cases $50 million or more.3 2
The problem with juries who react emotionally to a doctor's
malfeasance is that the doctor does not actually pay this penalty. To
the extent that money eventually is paid, it comes from the doctor's
malpractice insurer-whose policy premiums have almost no indi-
vidual experience rating. There are good, actuarial reasons for that
feature of malpractice insurance. The experience of being success-
fully sued is a sufficiently random event in doctors' lives that it pro-
vides little credible evidence of comparative levels of medical
29. See Brian Ostrom et al., What Are Tort Awards Really Like? The Untold Storyfrom State
Courts, 14 LAW & POL'y 77, 83-85 (1992) (finding that plaintiffs in a broad sample of state
courts won just 29% of medical malpractice verdicts, versus the 64% victory rate in
motor vehicle accident verdicts, and the 46% rate in products liability verdicts).
30. For various estimates of plaintiff malpractice victory rates, see Thomas B. Met-
zloff, Resolving Malpractice Disputes: Imaging the Jury's Shadow, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
43, 64 (1991). Metzloff discussed the sharp divergence in appraisals of the merits of
patients' cases by North Carolina malpractice insurers and juries and concluded that the
divergence was highly unfavorable to malpractice plaintiffs. Id. at 82-83.
31. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al.,juries and Justice: Are Malpractice and Other Personal
Injuries Created Equal? 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 16-21 (1991).
32. See, e.g., Marshall Sella, More Big Bucks in jury Verdicts: Additions to the 1988 List,
A.B.A.J.,July 1989, at 69 (reporting a $52 million verdict in Houston in 1988); Amy D.
Marcus,Juries Rule Against "Tort Reform" with Huge Awards, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1990, at
BI (reporting a $54 million verdict in Los Angeles in 198 9 );Jur
, 
Awards Record Amount to
Brain Damaged Boy, UPI, Nov. 8, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (noting
a $78 million verdict in Chicago in 1990). In the three years that I tracked jury verdicts,
medical malpractice cases ranked at or near the top of all damage awards.
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competence and litigation risk."3 That means that the burden of
malpractice awards rendered against a few doctors is borne equally
by all doctors practicing in that specialty and region who are being
insured against future suits. Because the size of the insurance pool
is typically quite small in the malpractice area, the price of malprac-
tice insurance for high-risk specialties in high-risk cities can sky-
rocket-ranging up to $200,000 a year for necessary levels of
coverage for surgeons and obstetricians in cities like New York and
Miami.34
Sudden hikes in malpractice insurance rates by risk-averse in-
surers, as occurred in both the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, produce
understandable outrage among doctors facing an immediate drop in
their take-home earnings, and send them to their state legislatures
for-often misguided-statutory responses. In the longer run,
though, doctors do not personally pay the cost of malpractice insur-
ance, no more than they pay the malpractice awards. These liability
costs are passed along to patients as part of the price of medical
services. In turn, most patients do not personally pay for their med-
ical treatment. These costs are borne by the health insurance sys-
tem, public or private, that now covers roughly eighty-five percent
of the care being delivered in this country. Therefore, it is the
American worker and taxpayer who ultimately pays the bill for our
malpractice system-buying a special form of insurance, in effect,
against the cost of negligently inflicted medical injury.
Viewed as a form of insurance, the malpractice regime has ma-
jor flaws. As noted above, tort benefits are doled out in a rather
arbitrary manner to some-but not most-deserving victims, and
also to those persons who are not even "deserving" within tort law's
fault-based frame of reference. Even worse, to make payment to the
relative handful of patients who do surmount the natural and legal
barriers to demonstrating legal entitlement to damages, the mal-
practice system must spend an inordinate amount of both time-
three years, on average, for all claims and five years for the more
serious claims-and money-nearly sixty cents of the malpractice
insurance dollar-litigating whether the doctor was at fault so that
the victim can be compensated.35
33. See John E. Rolph, Merit Rating for Physicians' .1alpractice Premiums: Only a Modest
Deterrent, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65 (1991) (discussing whether liability insurance
premiums should be based on a physician's malpractice record).
34. WEILER I, supra note 1, at 4.
35. For a discussion of the time it takes to resolve malpractice claims, see U.S. GEN-
ERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: CHARACTERISTICS OF CLAIMS CLOSED
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The fact that the target of malpractice claims is an individual
doctor, who has strong personal and professional incentives to fight
these cases, means that malpractice claims are more expensive to
litigate and more likely to go to a full trial. The fact that there are
numerous health care providers who may be involved in the treat-
ment of a particular patient-a family practitioner, internist, sur-
geon, and anesthetist, as well as the hospital-means that additional
litigation time and money is spent on infighting among the defend-
ants regarding who was truly to blame for the patient's injury.
From the point of view of defenders of the tort system, these
expenditures are warranted not because tort law is an efficient mode
of compensating patients for past injuries, but because it is an effec-
tive deterrent mechanism to motivate doctors to try to avoid injuries
to future patients. From the point of view of critics, however, this
behavioral reaction to the malpractice system is a major part of the
problem, rather than of the solution.
Doctors do sharply overestimate the threat of litigation, and
have a strong aversion to being sued, because they cannot insure
against the emotional trauma of a malpractice action. Doctors thus
adopt a variety of defensive measures to avoid suit whenever possi-
ble, often ordering extra laboratory tests, performing more elabo-
rate procedures (for example, Caesarean-section deliveries),
keeping more detailed medical records, and spending more time
with their patients. 6 Defensive medicine has been estimated to cost
roughly twice the amount of direct malpractice premiums, thus ele-
vating the total expense of malpractice litigation to $27 billion,
IN 1984, at 32-33 (1987) (finding that the median malpractice claim is brought 13
months after injury and the median length of time from claim to payment is 23 months);
FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., INSURING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 126 (1991) (recognizing that by
the fifth year following a given claim year, insurers have paid only about 50% of that
year's claims). For a discussion on the monetary costs of claims resolution, seeJAMES S.
KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION Xiii
(RAND Institute for Civil Justice 1986) (finding that for non-automobile torts, including
medical malpractice, the net compensation remaining in the hands of victims was 43%
of the total private and social expenditures on the processing and reimbursement of
these claims). A number of analyses conducted in the 1970s indicate that my estimate of
the transaction costs of medical malpractice at nearly 60 cents of the malpractice claims
dollar is likely conservative. See WEILER I, supra note 1, at 192 n.28.
36. In addition to the Harvard Study's broader evidence of physician reaction to
malpractice litigation, see generally WEILER I, supra note 1, ch. 6, a recently published
byproduct of the study documents the increased rates of Caesarean-section deliveries
associated with higher levels of malpractice litigation. See A. Russell Localio et al., Rela-
tionship Between Malpractice Claims and Caesarean Deliveries, 269 JAMA 366 (1993).
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rather than $9 billion.37
Nevertheless, defensive medicine just as easily can be viewed as
a compliment to, rather than an epithet against, the legal system.
Consider our reaction if it could be proved that motor vehicle litiga-
tion induces defensive driving and thereby saves lives and limbs.38
As I explained earlier, hospitals can be quite dangerous to our
health. To the extent, then, that the prospect of being sued induces
greater levels of care from providers, malpractice litigation is a so-
cial benefit, not a social cost. Indeed, imposing more rigorous med-
ical liability might actually save health care dollars because one of
the principal expenditures generated by medical injuries, as by any
injury, is the need for more treatment. In the Harvard Study, we
found that the additional health care expenditure required for treat-
ment of iatrogenic injuries was twice the cost of malpractice insur-
ance. 9 But this finding ignores the much greater cost of lost
earnings, household production, and enjoyment of life by patients
who were disabled or killed in medical accidents.
There are, however, a number of features of malpractice litiga-
tion that make it a less-than-ideal injury prevention mechanism. I
noted earlier the erratic manner in which the costs of litigation are
visited upon doctors, careful and negligent alike.40 Equally troub-
ling is tort law's emphasis on the individual fault of doctors or other
providers whose momentary inadvertence or mistake may have been
the immediate cause of an injury-though such legal fault takes
place within the context of a broader health care system that is not
doing all it can to reduce the occasions for, or consequences of, the
human error that is inevitable in our increasingly ambitious health
care system. 4
In the face of daunting statistical obstacles, my colleagues and I
were able to discern some injury prevention benefit from malprac-
tice litigation in New York.42 Thus, if faced with a choice between
37. The best study of the overall financial costs of malpractice litigation concluded
that the cost of "defensive medicine" in 1983-1984 was approximately twice the cost of
physician malpractice premiums ($3 billion) that year. Roger A. Reynolds et al., The Cost
of Medical Professional Liability, 257 JAMA 2776 (1987).
38. Actually, this has been proved. See 1 ALI REPORT, supra note 1, at 357-60.
39. WEILER I, supra note 1, at 85 & n.42.
40. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
41. See generally WEILER II, supra note 1, at 138.
42. In one part of our analysis, we compared on an aggregate hospital basis the rates
of negligent medical injuries to the rates of malpractice claims. While we found a nega-
tive relationship between the two-that is, more tort claims were associated with a
smaller proportion of negligent injury-this estimate was not statistically significant
given the limited size of the hospital-level data. Id. at 139. On the other hand, when we
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current fault-based liability and no liability at all, I would unhesitat-
ingly choose the former. When the range of policy choices is ex-
panded to encompass a very different, much broader brand of no-
fault liability, however, there is good reason to entertain the no-fault
model on the grounds of injury prevention as well as injury
compensation.
In sum, serious empirical research on medical malpractice liti-
gation presents a picture that does not square with the stereotypes
of either the doctors or the lawyers who operate within that system.
Contrary to doctors' impressions, injured patients do not sue at the
drop of a hat, encouraged by juries who bend over backwards to dip
into the deep pockets of malpractice insurers in order to do some-
thing for needy victims.4" There are far fewer suits than serious in-
juries;4 4 when claims are made, juries tend to sympathize more with
doctors than with patients;4 5 and even successful plaintiffs obtain,
on average, lower awards than they are supposedly entitled to
46receive.
It is hardly a testimonial to the litigation system favored by trial
lawyers, though, that most deserving complainants are not able to
collect any of the redress the law has promised them. Most of the
claims brought are the wrong ones, inflicting a good deal of stress
on innocent doctors and expense on the rest of the community.47
looked at the patient data, it revealed that those patients who were least likely to bring
tort claims-the elderly and the uninsured-were also those most likely to suffer from
negligent injury-a relationship that did prove to be statistically significant. See id. at
129-34.
43. WEILER I, supra note 1, at 13.
44. WEILER II, supra note 1, at 139. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
45. 2 ALI REPORT, supra note 1, at 111-14 & n.4; supra text accompanying notes 29-
30.
46. On the other hand, see supra note 31 and accompanying text for an estimate that
average malpractice awards are larger than those for comparable injuries caused by
other torts.
In a review of my book, Medical Malpractice on Trial, Professor Stephen Sugarman
used population-wide extrapolations from the Harvard Study findings to encapsulate the
true state of affairs. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doctor No, 58 U. Cm. L. REV. 1499, 1500-
02 (1991). Of nearly 40 million patients hospitalized every year, 1.5 million patients
suffer some disabling injuries, 400,000 of them negligently inflicted. Id. at 1501.
Although many more than 100,000 of these medical torts involved fatal or serious per-
manent disabilities, only 50,000 malpractice claims are made and 25,000 paid-of which
approximately 10,000 cases were paid in modest amounts because there was likely no
merit to the claims. Id. In his recent article, Michael Saks relied heavily upon the
Harvard Study-but corroborated it by a variety of other research findings-to present a
comparable picture of the broader personal injury-tort litigation relationship. See
Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-
And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147 (1992).
47. WEILER I, supra note I, at 15.
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Furthermore, tort damages are distributed in a highly erratic fash-
ion, with a few lucky plaintiffs collecting huge awards, while most of
the seriously injured receive much less than their actual economic
losses.48
I. NO-FAULT MEDICAL LIABILITY
We have to find a better way, then, to give injured patients the
redress they need and, at the same time, enhance the benefits and
reduce the burdens of legal liability upon our health care system. I
have argued elsewhere for major reforms that can be made within
the current tort-fault regime-in particular, legal rationalization of
tort damages-which does not include the doctors' pet reform of a
damages cap.4 9 Here, however, I will spell out the case for a very
different model of no-fault medical liability.
The traditional malpractice system assumes that if, and only if, a
patient has been injured by the fault of the physician or other health
care provider, the physician should pay the patient's losses, both fi-
nancial and nonfinancial.5 ° The culpable defendant must be legally
responsible for all these patient losses, irrespective of whether they
are also covered by alternative forms of insurance. Judgments
about both the doctor's fault and the patient's damages-awarded in
a single lump sum-are ultimately made by a lay jury at the end of
an elaborate litigation process. While ninety percent of malpractice
claims are settled voluntarily by the parties at some stage of the law-
suit,5 ' these negotiations take place within the shadow of the gov-
erning legal rules and prospective jury determinations.
Under my no-fault liability proposal,52 patients would be enti-
tled to compensation whenever they suffer a significant disability
48. See Sugarman, supra note 46, at 1502-04; see also WEILER I, supra note 1, at 2-7.
49. For my argument about why a cap, particularly one that is expressed in fixed
nominal dollars, is a highly regressive "reform" device that imposes almost the entire
burden of malpractice relief for doctors upon the most severely injured patients-who
are already the least generously compensated tort victims-see WEILER I, supra note 1, at
44-69 (chapter 3). Chapter 3 also develops the case for more fundamental and equitable
reforms in the principles of malpractice damages-if we choose to preserve the existing
tort-fault model of medical liability.
50. Id. at 15.
51. Id. at 53-54.
52. The proposal has also been endorsed by my colleagues in both the Harvard
Study, see WEILER II, supra note 1, at 151-52, and the American Law Institute Study. See
2 ALI REPORT, supra note 1, at 487-516.
At present, I am working with Senator Robert Graham of Florida and his staff to
develop a detailed statutory version of this proposal, which Senator Graham is contem-
plating introducing in Congress in 1993.
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caused by their medical treatment-irrespective of whether the
treatment was negligent. Compensation would be paid periodically
for the actual financial losses-health care costs and lost earnings-
that are not covered by either private or public insurance, and mod-
est additional amounts would be paid to severely injured patients to
help them adjust to their loss of enjoyment of life. The principal
target of liability would be not the individual doctor but the hospital
or other health care organization under whose auspices the patient
had been treated; such enterprise-based liability would extend to all
care rendered by doctors affiliated with the hospitals. Administra-
tion of this program would reside in a specialized and accessible tri-
bunal that would utilize explicit criteria and schedules to decide
what events are compensable and what payments are appropriate
for nonmeasurable losses.
As I consider the pros and cons of the several components of
this no-fault model, I will elaborate further on the details of the pro-
posal. Before so doing, I shall spell out my criteria for comparative
appraisal of the status quo and this fundamental alternative.
The traditional justification for the tort-fault model is corrective
justice: the principle that the burden of personal injury should be
shifted from innocent victim to culpable actor.53 While corrective
justice may still be the best explanation for the key ingredients of
our tort system as they are vividly displayed in medical malprac-
tice, 54 it no longer provides a persuasive moral justification for that
regime. The kind of legal negligence that tort litigation tends to
fasten upon in our increasingly ambitious health care system-mo-
mentary mistakes and slip-ups by busy doctors and nurses that in-
flict irreversible injuries upon patients-is at best an attenuated
form of personal fault. And even if one grants that it seems fairer-
as between a doctor who is slightly at fault and a patient who is en-
tirely innocent-to hold the doctor responsible for the injury to the
patient, the fact is that in our present system the legally negligent
doctor does not pay. Instead, the injured patient's losses incorpo-
rated in the tort award are distributed to the broader community
through the combination of doctors' liability insurance and patients'
health insurance. 55 Moreover, because tort law is a mandatory fea-
ture of the patient-health provider contract, we are all, in effect, re-
53. The most important contemporary exponent of this view is Professor Ernest
Weinrib. See ErnestJ. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485 (1989).
54. Causality, fault, and quantum of damages are, of course, the core features. WEI-
LER I, supra note 1, at 45.
55. See id. at 46-47.
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quired to purchase such disability insurance against the risk of
negligent medical injury.56 Liability law and its administration,
therefore, actually serve as a port of entry to these disability
benefits.
Once we recognize the complex interplay of medicine, law, and
insurance, more utilitarian judgments are required about how to
make this disability insurance system socially optimal. How sensibly
do the legal rules select which patient-victims and what types of
losses will be given compensation? How effective is the allocation of
liability among providers in the prevention of future injuries and
losses? How economical is the administration of such an insurance
program in the money, time, and emotional outlays required to
make decisions about rational prevention and compensation of
medical injury? 5 7
III. SENSIBLE COMPENSATION
In terms of compensation for past medical injuries, the single
biggest difference in the no-fault model is that insurance coverage
for patient losses will not turn on the fortuitous question whether
the injury can be proved to be the result of the negligence of a doc-
tor or other provider-proof that requires more monetary expendi-
tures than does payment to the few patients who successfully litigate
56. Id. at 47.
57. My views about how we should appraise alternative liability models are most
heavily influenced by GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS (1970), whose approach was more rigorously developed by STEVEN
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987), and applied to the malpractice
setting by PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1985). Professor Mark Grady, in his review of my 1991 book, mistakenly im-
puted to me the strange position that a combination of corrective justice and social in-
surance now serves as the justification for medical liability. See Mark F. Grady, Better
Medicine Causes More Lawsuits, and New Administrative Courts Will Not Solve the Problem, 86
Nw. U. L. REV. 1068, 1081-86 (1992). As I stated above, see supra text accompanying
notes 49-57, and equally clearly in Medical Malpractice on Trial, see WEILER I, supra note 1,
at 45-47, while I believe that corrective justice is the most coherent historical explanation
for the core features of the tort-fault model, it cannot serve as ajustification for contem-
porary tort law because the latter actually functions as a vehicle for mandatory disability
insurance. In deciding how to make this disability insurance socially optimal-or "effi-
cient," as I phrased it in Medical Malpractice on Trial-the most important criterion,
though not the only one, is prevention of medical injury. Id. at 47. It is precisely for that
reason that I rejected the social-insurance model in favor of a liability-insurance model
for handling medical injuries. Id. at 18. See also Sugarman, supra note 46, at 1522-24
(recognizing and criticizing my position). I have used this footnote to clarify this point
lest anyone else beside Professor Grady misread what I am saying about this crucial




Unquestionably, no-fault is a more sensible legal channel into
the disability insurance fund than is fault-based liability (though not
as good on that score as pure loss insurance). Such an expansion of
the legal reach of the program naturally evokes a major concern: If
it is now costing us so much malpractice money to compensate just a
tiny handful of medical accident victims, how could we possibly af-
ford to compensate the much larger number of victims who would
not only be eligible for, but also have readier access to, a no-fault
administrative compensation system?
At the level of fundamental principle, it must be noted initially,
the assertion that we cannot afford to pay for the cost of patient
injuries is simply wrong. If patients are injured as a result of medi-
cal accidents, the resulting costs will be "afforded" somehow-if not
by the broader community, then by the immediate victim and family.
Indeed, a good deal of the cost of medical accidents-the expense
of additional treatment and rehabilitation-is actually generated by
and handled within the health care system. The only issue is
whether these costs will be funneled through liability insurance or
handled directly by health insurance. Compensating the additional
cost of medical accidents would add only a small fraction to our al-
ready huge $840 billion health care budget.
Whatever the merits of the last argument as a matter of princi-
ple, it is not likely to fare particularly well in the political arena
where everyone is now concerned about how to pare, rather than
add to, our spiraling health care costs. Fortunately, there is also a
practical response to the affordability argument. While eligibility of
injured patients would not be conditioned on proof of provider
fault, coverage of particular patient losses-and therefore overall
system costs-would be contained in a variety of ways not addressed
by traditional tort law.
Under the common law of tort damages, the few victims who
are injured as a result of demonstrably careless treatment get full
compensation for all their losses-whether these losses are modest
or grave, financial or nonfinancial, covered by collateral sources or
entirely uninsured. Juries have broad discretion to settle on a sin-
gle, lump-sum award. The awards are occasionally in amounts that
seem inflated by tens of millions of dollars because of jury outrage
at the course of medical treatment painted in the courtroom. 59
58. See generally WEILER II, supra note 1, at 24.
59. For a discussion of this general phenomenon, see WEILER I, supra note 1, at 3-4.
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In a no-fault compensation system, by contrast, the principal
target of the available funds would be the tangible financial needs of
significantly disabled victims. Money would be provided to pay the
bills for medical treatment and physical or vocational rehabilitation.
Income would be made available on a periodic basis to replace the
patient's lost earnings or ability to perform valuable services in the
household. Some redress also would be provided for the nonfinan-
cial loss of enjoyment of life, but only for those suffering significant
long-term disabilities, and only in moderate amounts specified in an
age-adjusted schedule of physical impairments. Finally, patients
who need an attorney to successfully establish a contested claim
would be reimbursed for this legal cost of their injury. Ideally, such
costs would be reimbursed through a modest percentage formula
that provides reasonable returns for lawyers operating in this less
formal, less complex administrative process.6 °
The premise of this benefit design is that disability insurance
should be concentrated on the large financial losses of the smaller
number of accident victims who suffer substantial injuries, rather
than on the modest losses suffered by a much larger number of
slightly injured patients. If we are to mandate what still would be a
costly form of insurance, we should assume that people can absorb
small financial setbacks out of their own resources, and make the
object of our social concern those patients and families who suffer
severe losses.
In the case of medical accident insurance, the preferred "de-
ductible" format should be the duration of disability, rather than the
dollar amount of losses. Requiring proof that the patient was dis-
abled for a specified period of time makes it easier to disentangle
the medical costs and lost earnings that are attributable to the injury
from the losses that would normally be expected to flow from the
underlying illness and its treatment. The Harvard Study demon-
strates that a modest, two-month dividing line serves this purpose
quite well. 6 '
60. Awarding successful no-fault claimants reasonable attorney fees (reduced con-
siderably from the judicial level) is a feature of a number of workers' compensation
systems, and one that flows naturally from the underlying premise that the focus of such
compensation should be on the tangible financial needs of disabled victims. Stated in
somewhat simplistic terms, just as we pay the bills for doctors needed by claimants to
treat the physical aspects of their injuries, we must pay the bills for lawyers needed by
claimants to resolve legal-economic disputes occasioned by their injuries. See WEILER I,
supra note 1, at 61-69, for necessary refinements in, and qualifications to, this proposal.
61. See WEILER II, supra note 1, at 101-03. See also infra note 77.
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A much bigger cost-saving comes from the fact that mandatory
patient compensation should reimburse only those losses not cov-
ered by other sources of public and private loss insurance. The rea-
son for such an offset is that loss insurance is a considerably more
accessible and efficient conduit for injury redress than is a no-fault
liability regime that requires judgment about the cause of-if not the
fault for-the injuries for which benefits are sought. Particularly for
health care, but also for much of lost earnings, these alternative
forms of insurance are available for the bulk of the injury costs that
fall within the two-month deductible period spelled out above.
Finally, while it probably is fair to provide unlimited coverage
for long-term medical and rehabilitation costs, only a designated
proportion of net lost wages should be replaced. If we follow the
example of no-fault workers' compensation, we would reimburse
two-thirds of gross earnings (or eighty percent of net earnings) up
to a ceiling set at approximately 200 percent of the average wage in
the jurisdiction.
This last benefit constraint has two policy justifications. One is
to secure more equitable distribution of the benefits and burdens of
medical liability insurance. In the current tort system-which re-
places all lost earnings, however high they may be-damages awards
paid to persons with high incomes are much larger than awards paid
to those persons with smaller incomes. In addition, the prospect of
such higher awards makes the wealthier group's claims much more
attractive to litigators who are paid on a contingent, percentage-fee
basis. The financial burden of malpractice insurance, however, ulti-
mately falls on the people who pay the bills for medical services or
premiums for health insurance. Worse, the prices and premiums
charged do not vary according to the incomes of the consumers
forced to buy this form of disability insurance as one component of
their health care bills. Eliminating this regressive income redistribu-
tion of traditional tort liability is one reason for limiting the scope of
income replacement to a reasonable range approximating the com-
munity average. Those with higher incomes can-and most do-
voluntarily purchase the additional disability protection they need
to protect their higher income levels.
The second justification for shifting from full compensation to
some degree of cost-sharing is that the latter will reduce the risk of
moral hazard on the part of victims who might otherwise alter their
behavior patterns when they realize that all their financial losses are
going to be made up from such an external source. I doubt that this
is a significant factor in inducing careless behavior by potential vic-
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tims prior to their injuries-particularly in the medical context,
where most serious iatrogenic injuries are inflicted on patients who
are comparatively passive recipients of treatment. A more substan-
tial problem arises in the aftermath of the medical accident. At that
point the patient's decisions about how strenuous a rehabilitation
regime to undertake, and whether and when to return to work, are
important determinants of the total economic loss that will flow
from the original injury. From that can be seen the virtue of a coin-
surance component under which individual victims bear some share
of their lost earnings in order to maintain their incentive to return
to work and reduce total earnings losses.
The Harvard Study undertook an in-depth investigation of
whether a no-fault medical liability model as described above would
be "affordable" as compared with the present costs of malpractice
insurance. We were pleasantly surprised to finish our inquiry with
an affirmative answer.62 Admittedly, New York is one of the nation's
leaders in malpractice litigation and insurance costs. But in that
state-and likely also in Florida, Michigan, Illinois, and a few
others-citizens can purchase this more comprehensive and better-
tailored form of no-fault insurance for roughly the same amount of
money they are now spending on the existing malpractice insurance
system. Furthermore, that cost equation does not take account of
either the substantial emotional stress experienced by doctors-and
patients-who become embroiled in litigation, or the sizable finan-
cial expenditures generated by unnecessary and excessive defensive
medicine. 63
IV. ECONOMICAL ADMINISTRATION
As I noted earlier, the single biggest cost-saving feature of no-
fault medical insurance would be the deduction of amounts paid by
collateral sources of insurance, principally health insurance but also
sick leave or disability insurance benefits. Implementation of this
rule requires not only alteration of state common law that tradition-
ally has ignored collateral source payments-a step that a number of
states have already taken for medical malpractice 64-but also re-
quires changes in federal legislation-specifically, Medicare, Medi-
caid, and ERISA-that now precludes states from removing the
62. See id. at 105-09.
63. See WEILER I, supra note 1, at 85 (discussing the costs of defensive medicine).
64. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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subrogation rights of these key loss insurers.65 The justification for
such legislative action cannot simply be to save costs: the direct
payments have merely been shifted from one insurance account to
another. The justification, instead, is that making liability insurance
secondary to loss insurance produces savings in overall insurance
costs. Whereas no-fault workers' compensation, for example,
spends roughly twenty cents of each claims dollar on administration,
public and private health insurance spends between five and ten
cents of each claims dollar for this purpose.6 6
Because malpractice litigation uses up approximately fifty-five
to sixty percent of the claims dollar-not even counting the business
costs incurred by all forms of private insurance to accumulate insur-
ance funds by selling coverage, and collecting and investing premi-
ums 67 -the same argument of cost savings can be made for
substituting no-fault for fault-based liability.68 These administrative
savings help make it possible to compensate more victims for
roughly the same amount of money.69
Medical malpractice is an especially costly form of litigation for
several reasons. First, it is hard for patients to detect and document
provider fault. 7' This process often requires extensive discovery
before the essential facts are uncovered and the claim can then be
either paid or dropped. Second, doctors have strong personal and
professional incentives to fight hard against any such admission or
finding of carelessness on their part. This is one reason why mal-
practice cases take far longer to dispose of than motor vehicle cases,
65. See FMC Corp. v. Holiday, 111 S. Ct. 403 (1990) (holding that ERISA pre-
empted a Pennsylvania law that precluded subrogation of tort claims to employee wel-
fare benefit plans); Rubin v. Sullivan, 720 F. Supp. 840 (D. Haw. 1989) (holding that the
Medicare statute precluded matching funds where no-fault insurance policies made
Medicaid the primary insurer); Abrams v. Heckler, 582 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (upholding a rule promulgated by the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services that denied Medicare benefits for medical costs collaterally covered by
automobile insurance policies). See also Bobbitt et al., supra note 16, at 866-68 (discuss-
ing collateral payments).
66. See WEILER II, supra note 1, at 139-44; George L. Priest, The Current Insurance
Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1560 (1987).
67. See WEILER II, supra note 1, at 139.
68. Professor Sugarman provided a synopsis of the current use of the malpractice
liability insurance dollar, excluding the 11 cents that goes for business costs. Sugarman,
supra note 46, at 1502-03. Of the claims dollar, 57 cents is spent on processing costs and
43 cents is paid to victims, of which 20 cents goes for pain and suffering and 23 cents for
financial loss. See WEILER I, supra note 1, at 53 & n.28. Of the financial compensation,
11 cents is expended for items already covered by collateral insurance sources, leaving
just 12 cents spent on the actual financial losses of injured victims. Id.
69. WElLER II, supra note 1, at 139.
70. See id. at 13.
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for example, with a much higher proportion going on to a full jury
trial. 7' Finally, by contrast with products liability suits, where the
defendant is a single corporate organization, malpractice suits often
involve multiple actors, each of whom spend duplicate resources in
protracted disputes involving not only the patient-plaintiff, but also
each other.72
The shift to no-fault liability-borne by the health care enter-
prise rather than individual doctors-will eliminate much of the ex-
pense and trauma of that legal struggle. Indeed, if the experience in
Sweden is any indication, some doctors will often help their patients
secure disability benefits for treatment-related injuries, rather than
fight tooth-and-nail against such an outcome. Moreover, once enti-
tlement is established, benefits are paid on a periodic basis. This
allows patients to collect the needed funds early in the recuperation
period, rather than waiting until their disability is fully stabilized so
that lawyers and juries can project total lump sum damages, predic-
tions that rarely are on the mark in any case.
In addition to these alterations in substantive rules, there would
be a major change in forum and procedure. Once the common
law's focus on fault and its overtones of corrective justice have been
dispensed with,73 it is easier to shift medical injury cases out of the
elaborate and expensive civil-litigation system and into an informal,
streamlined, administrative process. Rather than relying on the ver-
dicts of lay juries assembled ad hoc for each contested case, awards
would be made by experienced adjudicators acting in accordance
with guidelines established by a specialized administrative tribunal.
One byproduct of the shift in forum is that states could dispense
with medical screening panels, which were created and funded in an
attempt to produce more accurate malpractice decisions."
These apparent administrative values of no-fault, however, en-
counter a serious objection in the medical context. Critics believe
that finding the true cause of a patient's disability would typically be
as difficult as determining the doctor's fault under the current mal-
71. In state courts in 1988, 5% of all tort cases were resolved by a trial verdict, as
compared to 11% of all malpractice cases. Saks, supra note 46, at 1228; see also Metzloff,
supra note 30, at 49-50 (finding that 13% of North Carolina's malpractice suits pro-
ceeded to trial and 11% were tried to verdict).
72. A typical malpractice suit might name as codefendants the patient's family physi-
cian, internist, surgeon, anesthesiologist, radiologist, and other members of the hospi-
tal's staff, all of whom are vitally interested in shifting liability away from themselves.
73. See Saks, supra note 46, at 44-47 (discussing the concept of corrective justice and
its influence on tort litigation); supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
74. Saks, supra note 46, at 29.
1993] 927
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
practice system.75 If that be the case, adoption of a more accessible
no-fault system might generate even higher administrative expendi-
tures because a larger number of patients would be lodging equally
contentious claims.
Unquestionably it is harder to prove that medical treatment
caused a patient's injury than to prove that a car caused injury to a
driver or pedestrian, or that employment caused injury to a worker.
Unlike the driver who gets into a car or the employee who goes to
work, a patient who enters a hospital may already be suffering from
an underlying illness which itself may be the cause of the eventual
disability. If someone breaks a leg from a fall at work or in a car
crash, that person enters the hospital for treatment but may emerge
with a permanent limp. The consequences of this disability are
properly chargeable to the health care system only if the disability
was caused by the treatment received in the hospital, rather than by
the original accident. Indeed, it is evident that some of an injured
patient's medical expenses and lost earnings must be attributable to
her initial unhealthy condition and its treatment and expected recu-
peration. Determining whether medical treatment worsened the
original condition-and estimating any corresponding financial
loss-requires delicate judgmentsabout what transpired inside the
hospital, and how that treatment altered the path that the patient's
condition would otherwise have been expected to follow.
The problem is more complex than simply identifying, factu-
ally, which losses-for example, which episodes of lost work and
earnings-were caused by medical treatment. Equally difficult are
the conceptual issues concerning which losses are properly attributa-
ble to a specialized program of liability for health care injuries. Doc-
tors often undertake such traumatic medical procedures, for
example, radical chemotherapy for cancer, because intervention is
necessary to arrest and cure a disease that is even more life-threat-
ening than the treatment. Consequently, in assessing liability it is
not enough to decide that a particular disability episode was the
consequence of-that it arose out of and in the course of-medical
75. This was the principal reason why some of the leading scholarly exponents of no-
fault in other contexts, such as motor vehicle accidents, had grave reservations about the
viability of this concept in the medical sphere. See Robert E. Keeton, Compensation for
Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 590, 594 (1973); Guido Calabresi, The Problem of
Malpractice: Trying to Round Out the Circle, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 131, 137 (1977); Richard
A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: Its Cause and Cure, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE 245, 257-58, 262 (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1978).
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treatment. The disability must fall outside the range of intended or
expected consequences of the treatment.
To illustrate, suppose that a person arrived at a hospital with a
broken leg complicated by serious infection, and that-prior to ad-
mission-gangrene had set in. Imagine further that, in the doctor's
medical judgment, amputation of the leg was necessary to save the
patient's life, and that the patient consented to the operation.
Although it is true that the amputation directly caused the loss of
the leg, one would certainly not conclude-from the standpoint of
liability policy-that medical treatment was the relevant cause of the
loss. The patient's initial unhealthy condition required this radical
intervention, and thus the underlying condition must be deemed the
true cause of the loss of the leg. If the medical treatment had
caused the infection and subsequent amputation, however, the loss
properly would be the responsibility of a no-fault patient compensa-
tion scheme.
In fact, not even in this hypothetical case of an identifiable ia-
trogenic injury should all the costs of the disability be compensable.
The initial condition of a broken leg would itself normally have pro-
duced some hospital and medical expenses and lost earnings during
the period of treatment and recuperation. Only the additional inju-
ries resulting from infection and amputation would be attributable
to the health care system. In practice, it would likely be too costly
and burdensome to have a patient-compensation program always
try to isolate precisely which of the immediate economic conse-
quences were attributable to the original, unhealthy condition and
which to the iatrogenic injury, even after determining that such an
injury had occurred. For this reason, the program would feature the
across-the-board rule mentioned earlier,76 that no-fault insurance is
available only after a two-month period of disability had run. Such a
threshold not only finesses this particularly troublesome aspect of
the causal inquiry, but it also concentrates the program's resources
on longer-term disability, which is the proper focus of mandatory
insurance under either fault-based or no-fault liability criteria.77
76. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
77. The Harvard Study found that a two-month deductible would exclude only 10%
of total net losses suffered by injured patients in New York, but would cut to one-half the
number of potential claimants for medical benefits, to one-quarter the number for wage-
loss benefits, and to one-tenth the number for household-production benefits. WEILER
II, supra note i, at 10 1-03. The last benefit would likely be the most difficult to adminis-
ter in practice. Id.
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The target of a patient-compensation program, therefore, is the
unintended or unexpected adverse consequence of medical care,
not the inevitable or regular consequence of treatment that would
have been undertaken even if one had known, ex ante, of the harmful
consequences that would flow from the medical intervention. Even
so, drawing the line between unintended and inevitable conse-
quences is not tantamount to conducting an inquiry about the doc-
tor's fault. Let us consider three cases to illustrate the difference.
In the first case, a patient has a breast lump that a biopsy indi-
cates is malignant. On the recommendation of her doctor, the pa-
tient agrees to a mastectomy. Once a more complete examination
of the tissue becomes possible after surgery, however, the earlier
diagnosis is revised: the lump is benign. In the second case, a pa-
tient is diagnosed with a condition that is best treated with a particu-
lar drug. When the patient uses the prescribed drug, however, it
becomes evident for the first time that he is susceptible to a reaction
to the drug that is even worse than the original illness, which might
instead have been addressed with a different, although less effective,
treatment. In the third case, a coronary catheterization required by
the patient's condition unfortunately precipitates a blood clot that
travels to the patient's foot and cuts off the flow of blood. This rare,
but not unheard-of, event requires amputation.
Under the fault-based system, the doctors' behavior would be
scrutinized from the perspective of the situations as they appeared
at the time the treatment decisions were made. Therefore, negli-
gence would not be found in any of these cases because the medical
judgments were perfectly reasonable in light of the information
available about the risks and benefits of the courses of treatment.
Under the no-fault patient-compensation scheme, however, in which
the situation would be considered with the aid of hindsight, it is evi-
dent that the harmful events-amputation of the foot, severe drug
reaction, and removal of a normal breast-were not inevitable re-
sults of treatment required to cure the patients' condition, unlike
the removal of a gangrenous leg. If any of the resulting disabilities
fit within the benefit structure of the program, they would be
compensable.
Ultimately, though, it is not possible to design a program for
pure no-fault patient compensation. All of my examples to this
point consisted of positive, although harmful, consequences of med-
ical intervention-acts of commission. The particularly difficult
cases in the medical setting are instances of omission, in which the
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harmful consequence is attributable to a failure to properly diag-
nose and treat the patient's condition in the first place.
Consider the example of a patient undergoing treatment for
cancer who dies in the hospital as a result of the malignancy. The
death is caused by the original condition, not the treatment. Con-
trast this with a case in which the patient dies as the result of an
inadvertent overdose of chemotherapy, a positive medical interven-
tion. The matter becomes more complicated, however, if the cancer
in the first example was a curable one, such as an early Hodgkin's
lymphoma that was not properly diagnosed or treated in the hospi-
tal. In that instance, even though it may be descriptively accurate to
conclude that cancer was the factual cause of death, legal policy
would judge the significant cause to be the doctor's failure to inter-
rupt the natural development of the tumor-an act of omission.
Our notion of causation must be broadened, therefore, to in-
clude what might be called policy causation-what should have hap-
pened-as opposed to purely factual causation-what did or might
have happened. If causation is so broad, however, we must ensure
that a self-contained patient-compensation program does not even-
tually become a general social insurance for every disability or fatal-
ity that medical care did not prevent or cure. To prevent this, one
must establish criteria specifying what should have happened,
thereby distinguishing the properly compensable cases from the
noncompensable ones. The easy cases are those in which treatment
was impossible. If a disease cannot be cured, it should be the re-
sponsibility of broad-based social insurance, public or private, to
pay for the victim's losses from such diseases. This role should not
be assigned to a patient-compensation program, which is supposed
to saddle the health care system with only those costs of disabling
injuries that are attributable to its own operations.
Suppose, however, that the disease could have been cured if it
had been treated by the top practitioner in one of the major teach-
ing hospitals of the world. Under that optimal care standard, com-
pensation should be available for any disability that could probably
have been avoided by some doctor, somewhere. That would likely
be a very expensive compensation program. To avoid going that
far-by choosing to compensate only disabilities that would have
been cured by the reasonable care expected from the average doctor in
an actual practice setting-it is necessary to reinstate the fault prin-




The foregoing cases illustrate the admitted conceptual and
practical difficulties that confront efforts to transplant the no-fault
model into the medical setting. But the fact that there are real diffi-
culties in designing such a liability alternative is not a sufficient rea-
son for rigid adherence to the tort status quo. Indeed, tort law itself
must grapple with the same, knotty, causal questions. Once a court
decides that a doctor was at fault in the standard of care provided, it
must then make a second determination of whether the medical
negligence was actually the cause of harm to the patient for which
damages are sought. Such harm would of course include the failure
to cure a disease that should have been manageable. In a series of
cases over the last decade dealing with this issue, known as "loss of a
chance," courts have grappled more and more frankly with the
problem of what to do about a patient who went to a doctor with an
existing cancer or heart disease, but who now argues that the doc-
tor's failure to properly diagnose or treat the condition deprived her
of a real, though perhaps less than an even, chance of survival. 78
In any event, even though questions of causation can be conun-
drums in either the tort or the no-fault setting, the evidence is that
the causal inquiry-the sole question in the no-fault scheme-is
generally far less difficult than the fault determination that must be
made-in addition to the causal inquiry-in the tort-fault system.
Only a small fraction-five percent--of the Harvard Study review-
ers' causal judgments were "close calls," a mere quarter of the pro-
portion of difficult standard-of-care judgments the doctors had to
make.79 Moreover, the results of the academic investigation in New
York are corroborated by experience in Sweden and New Zealand,
two countries that have provided no-fault compensation for medical
injuries for nearly two decades. While administrators in both coun-
tries have regularly encountered individual cases that pose knotty
78. See, e.g., Fennell v. Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr., 320 Md. 776, 780-94, 580 A.2d 206,
208-15 (1990) (analyzing in depth the question whether loss of a chance of survival
could be compensable under either a relaxed standard of causation or as a new element
of damages); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 477 (Okla. 1987)
(holding that in medical malpractice cases involving the loss of less than an even chance
of recovery or survival, the question of proximate cause is for the jury if the plaintiff
shows that the defendant's conduct caused a substantial reduction of the patient's
chance of recovery or survival, irrespective of statistical evidence); Herskovits v. Group
Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 479 (Wash. 1983) ("[M]edical testimony of a reduction of
chance of survival from 39 to 25 percent is sufficient evidence to send the issue of proxi-
mate cause to the jury."); see also Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, 'aluation, and Chance in
Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J.
1353 (1981).
79. WEILER I, supra note 1, at 144.
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legal problems, they have been able, as a general matter, to draw the
causal dividing line without any pronounced burden on the no-fault
programs as a whole.
Still, I am under no illusion that foreign administrative experi-
ence, let alone a single academic investigation, can be readily dupli-
cated in the American legal system. Such a system supplies able and
aggressive lawyers to parties with a real incentive to do battle in the
administrative, as well as in the judicial, setting. That is why it is
crucial that no-fault medical liability, if it is to be successful, make
use of a legal-medical device known as "designated compensable
events" (DCEs).s °
DCEs are formulas that spell out that if a patient undergoes a
certain medical procedure (for example, hernia repair) and later dis-
plays a particular outcome (for example, infarction of the bowel),
the latter injury would automatically be compensable to the extent it
produces the kinds of disabling loss that are covered by the plan's
benefit schedule."' These DCE formulas would be (as they have
been) developed by teams of doctors and lawyers to address recur-
ring problems of medical injury causation by identifying those treat-
ment-outcome relationships that typically meet (or do not meet) the
concept of compensable iatrogenic injury stated earlier-an unex-
pected or avoidable adverse event, as opposed to the inevitable or
anticipated traumatic byproduct of necessary treatments. Plan ad-
ministrators would then be able to use any such formulas that apply
to particular cases coming before them, saving them from having to
conduct a full-scale inquiry about medical causation in each individ-
ual case.
Tentative lists of DCEs have already been devised for such
medical-litigation settings as general surgery, orthopedic surgery,
and obstetrics.82 Investigations have shown that these lists cover a
high proportion of the more serious cases that are now litigated and
80. The notion of designated compensable events was first developed and advocated
in the mid-1970s by Clark Havighurst and Laurence Tancredi as an offshoot of their
proposal for "medical adversity insurance," which proposed experimentation with this
idea. See ABA COMM'N ON MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, DESIGNATED COMPENSABLE
EVENT SYSTEM: A FEASIBILITY STUDY 8 (1990). More recently, Professor Tancredi, in
conjunction with Randall Bovbjerg, has been refining and testing this concept under the
nomenclature of "accelerated-compensable events." See Laurence R. Tancredi & Randall
R. Bovbjerg, Rethinking Responsibility for Patient Injury: Accelerated-Compensation Events, 4
Malpractice and Quality Reform Ripe for a Test, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 148 (Spring
1991) (arguing that reforms based on accelerated-compensation events would lead to
more equitable compensation).
81. WEILER II, supra note 1, at 149.
82. Id. at 151.
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the potentially compensable events identified by the Harvard
Study.8 3 There is no doubt that implementation of such no-fault
medical-accident criteria would be far more predictable and eco-
nomical than current inquiries about provider negligence.8 4 The
question, though, is whether DCEs should be employed as a form of
selective no-fault compensation with fault-based malpractice law in
the background, as some DCE proponents advocate, 5 or used only
if incorporated into a comprehensive no-fault program that bases
compensation for events not covered by a DCE upon individualized
judgments about medical causation rather than provider fault.
I strongly favor the latter setting for use of the DCE model, for
reasons of both individual equity and institutional politics. Sup-
pose, instead, that DCEs were used to carve out a limited no-fault
preserve within the broader malpractice terrain. The consequence
would be that the victim of any surgical injury that was covered by a
DCE formula would collect only the limited benefits considered ap-
propriate under no-fault. However, the victim of another surgical
mishap not yet covered by a DCE would be free to try to prove pro-
vider-fault to collect one of the huge awards that juries may render
under the common-law standards of tort recovery. The trouble is
that the first patient may well have been the victim of more egre-
giously negligent treatment than the second patient, perhaps ren-
dered in the very same hospital operating room, but the relative size
of recovery would turn on the fact that a DCE had been devised for
one kind of case but not for the other.
That unfair disparity in treatment of prior patient-victims
would, in turn, produce pitched political battles about development
of future DCE formulas. Doctors and defense attorneys would natu-
rally want DCEs devised for all of the cases that were most likely to
83. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Obstetrics and .Malpractice: Evidence on the Performance
of a Selective No-Fault System, 265 JAMA 2836, 2838 (1991) (concluding that accelerated-
compensation events would resolve cases more efficiently than the current system). In
their study, the authors applied their initial list of obstetrical DCEs to a sample of more
than 300 obstetrical claims filed over a six-year period, and found that the DCE list
covered half the obstetrical claims, two-thirds of claims involving serious permanent in-
juries, and three-quarters of the tort indemnities actually paid on claims. Id. Initial re-
sults from application of lists of both obstetrical and surgical DCEs to the broader
sample of patient injuries, which was not as limited as the Harvard Study's focus on tort
claims, also found that these formulas covered substantial proportions of potentially
compensable surgical and obstetrical events. Tancredi & Bovbjerg, sipra note 80, at
159-61.
84. See, e.g., Tancredi & Bovbjerg, supra note 80, at 2842 (concluding that acceler-
ated-compensation events would resolve cases more efficiently and with greater regular-
ity than the current system).
85. Professors Tancredi and Bovbjerg, in particular, advocate this. See generallv id.
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produce viable malpractice claims, but would prefer to leave uncov-
ered those cases that were least likely to surface in viable litigation.
Patients and plaintiff attorneys would be inclined in precisely the
opposite direction, and the resulting tug-of-war would hardly con-
stitute a reasoned inquiry into the appropriate scope and context of
DCEs or health care in general.
Instead, we should decide as a matter of fundamental principle
whether, all things considered, no-fault is a better liability model for
patients and doctors than tort-fault. If we do opt for a broad no-
fault program, DCEs can be a valuable administrative device within
that program. However, availability of such a formula for attribut-
ing a particular type of injury to a specified form of medical treat-
ment should not be the litmus test of whether the injury is to be
governed by one or the other of these radically different liability
regimes.
Assuming we were to adopt some version of medical no-fault, a
key component of this program would be a DCE panel-comprised
of medical scientists and practitioners who are knowledgeable about
the usual connection between treatments and outcomes, and plan
administrators and lawyers who are knowledgeable about the diffi-
culties in identifying the true causes of patient disability when indi-
vidual claims are lodged. DCE formulas would be regularly devised
and revised on the basis of both new claims experience and schol-
arly research. And because all that would ride on the decision to
adopt a proposed DCE standard would be whether to use this some-
what cruder, but much less contentious, mode of no-fault claims ad-
ministration for a particular injury, the DCE inquiry is likely to
generate a good deal more light and less heat.
V. EFFECTIVE PREVENTION
With the help of DCEs, no-fault patient compensation will be
administratively feasible, just as it will be financially affordable. But
while elimination of the fault inquiry would slash the present admin-
istrative share of the claims dollar from nearly sixty percent to less
than thirty percent, that share could be reduced by yet another two-
thirds-to ten percent or less-if we also eliminate the inquiry into
the cause of a patient's injury, and provide compensation simply on
the basis of the type and magnitude of losses suffered.8"
86. WEILER II, supra note 1, at 106; see also Priest, supra note 66, at 1560. Professor
Priest estimated that "Blue Cross-Blue Shield first-party health insurance administrative
costs are 10% of benefits; SSI disability insurance administrative costs are 8% of bene-
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Consider, for example, the no-fault schemes recently adopted
in Virginia and Florida for babies who suffer neurological injuries
during delivery.8 7 These programs provide generous compensation
for the resulting medical and rehabilitation expenses, as well as
modest replacement of future lost earnings and an allowance for
nonfinancial harm .8  However, only a small fraction of infants born
with cerebral palsy or other birth defects sustain these injuries as a
result of medical treatment. 89 Experience in both states demon-
strates that it is extremely difficult for infants and their families to
show that they had iatrogenic injury cases, 90 because the symptoms
of this condition often do not manifest themselves until years later.
Thus, the most recent "bad baby" proposal in North Carolina
would extend insurance coverage to all cerebral palsy cases, except
for cases of genetic inheritance or maternal substance abuse that
clearly were not attributable to the birthing process.9 '
From the vantage point of the disabled child, however, even
that last exclusion seems arbitrary-granting compensation for the
present losses of some infants but not others simply because of the
way in which their respective injuries appear to have occurred years
earlier. More generally, why should one advocate a program that
requires health care organizations to guarantee patients redress for
medical-care costs that stem from disabling injuries suffered inside
the hospital, when there is no social guarantee of health-insurance
coverage for the injuries or illnesses that brought the patients into
the hospital in the first place? From a compensation perspective,
there is no doubt that, if we leave the tort-fault regime in search of
more sensible compensation and economical administration, a cate-
gorical program of no-fault medical liability based only on the cause
fits; Workers' Compensation disability insurance administrative costs are (a much-criti-
cized) 21% of benefits." Id.
87. See Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Compensation Act, VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (1990 & Michie Supp. 1991); Act Relating to Medical Incidents,
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.101-316 (West Supp. 1993).
88. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5009.3 to -5009.4. The Florida Act does not compensate
for lost wages as does the Virginia Act, but it does allow for a non-economic damage
award of up to $100,000 to the infant's parents or legal guardians. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 766.301(1)(6).
89. Bobbitt et al., supra note 16, at 842 (noting that most current studies have failed
to establish a causal relationship between medical mismanagement and cerebral palsy).
90. As of mid-1991, three and one-half years after the Virginia Act came into effect
and two and one-half years after the Florida Act came into effect, only two compensation
claims had been filed in Virginia, both initially rejected and under appeal, and twelve
had been filed in Florida, eight accepted and four still under investigation. Id. at 854
n. 114.
91. Id. at 859 n.137.
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of the injury should be a way-station on the road to broader social
insurance for all victims against especially catastrophic losses.
The reason why we should stop at no-fault is that such a pro-
gram can play a significant deterrent role in preventing medical in-
juries before the fact, rather than simply concentrating on
compensation for victims after the fact. The distinctive virtue of no-
fault liability is that such a regime imposes responsibility for disa-
bling injuries upon the enterprise whose activities caused the injury,
and thereby creates a financial incentive for the enterprise to take
steps that will reduce the risk of such injuries in the future.
The no-fault program I endorse, then, is very different from the
standard version of medical no-fault, whether exhibited by the nar-
row, brain-damaged-baby plans in Virginia and Florida or by the
comprehensive medical accident plans in Sweden and New Zealand.
Each of these programs diffuses responsibility for compensating
medical injuries among all those required to contribute to the insur-
ance fund in question. The preferred model for enterprise medical
liability instead is workers' compensation, which makes individual
employers, including hospitals, legally responsible for injuries that
occur to their employees as a result of working in the employers'
operations.92 While insurance against such no-fault liability is avail-
able to organizations not large enough to shoulder the risk on their
own, such insurance can be experience-rated in an actuarially credi-
ble way to maintain a potent incentive for the enterprise to prevent
injuries, both occupational and medical, and so avoid its legal and
financial liability.
From this perspective, no-fault and tort-fault liability are both
members of the broader family of liability regimes. Retention of
some version of legal liability for medical accidents is crucial to
those who, like myself, are uncomfortable with the idea of relying
solely on ethical, market, or regulatory incentives to ensure the nec-
essary levels of safety and quality in modern-day medicine.93
It is clear that the prospect of malpractice liability does induce
substantial changes in the behavior of medical providers trying to
avoid the threat of suit. In the face of major statistical obstacles
posed by our limited data base, the Harvard Study found some posi-
tive evidence that such altered provider behavior also reduces the
92. 1 ALI REPORT, supra note 1, at 105-27 (describing a no-fault workers' compensa-
tion model). This chapter of the ALl Report drew on a larger background paper that the
author wrote in 1986 for the ALI Study.




likelihood of negligent injury to patients. In the motor vehicle area,
with much broader data sets, scholars have shown that dispensing
with tort liability and substituting the loss insurance model of typical
auto no-fault plans raises the incidence of motor vehicle injuries
that require such compensation.94 On the other hand, the workers'
compensation model of no-fault liability imposed on the employer
in whose enterprise occupational injuries occur can be credited with
reducing the rate of worker deaths by somewhere between twenty-
five and forty-five percent.9 5 The key difference is that workers'
compensation imposes on an organization-the employer-a direct
financial incentive to take the measures necessary to reduce unwar-
ranted hazards in its operations, including the human errors of em-
ployees and contractors.
As a matter of general principle, one would expect the model of
strict institutional liability for medical injury to be considerably
more effective than present, fault-based personal liability. Whatever
tort law may say, the financial burden of defending against and pay-
ing for malpractice suits is borne not by the individual negligent
doctor, but by all of the physicians in that specialty and region who
must pay premiums for malpractice insurance coverage, under poli-
cies that make almost no adjustment in premiums charged to take
account of differences in the number of meritorious claims against
94. The best such evidence comes from Quebec which, unlike American states with
no-fault auto plans, totally replaced the tort system with a no-fault compensation
scheme in the late 1970s. See Jeffrey O'Connell & Charles Tenser, North America's Most
Ambitious No-Fault Law: Quebec's Auto Insurance Act, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 917 (1987).
Research done about the effect of the Quebec plan indicated that the province's shift in
liability policy did increase hazards on its highways. Mark Gaudry, The Effects on Road
Safety of the Compulsory Insurance, Flat Premium Rating and .Vo-Fault Features of the 1978 Quebec
Automobile Act, in 2 REPORT OF ENQUIRY INTO MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION
IN ONTARIO (1988). Gaudry attributes the 7% increase in motor vehicle fatalities en-
tirely to the Quebec plan's flat-rate premium system for motor vehicle insurance, which
attracted larger numbers of high-risk drivers onto Quebec highways. Id. In another
study, Rose Anne Devlin estimated that the impact of no-fault on fatality rates was even
higher-I 4%-and concluded that a substantial proportion of this increase was due to a
reduction in driving precautions induced by the no-fault model. Rose Anne Devlin, Lia-
bility Versus No-Fault Automobile Insurance Regimes: An Analysis of the Experience in
Quebec 212 (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto).
95. See MICHAEL J. MOORE & W. KIP Viscusi, COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR JOB
RISKS: WAGES, WORKERS' COMPENSATION, AND PRODUCT LIABILITY 121-35 (1990) (docu-
menting a negative relationship between benefits and the severity of work-related acci-
dents); cf. Michael J. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, Promoting Safety Through Workers*
Compensation: The Efficacy and Net Wl'age Costs of hjury Insurance, 20 RAND J. ECON. 499
(1989) (concluding from a different methodology that fatality rates would increase by
20% in the absence of workers' compensation).
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individual insureds. 96 The no-fault program I have in mind would
impose legal responsibility on hospitals or other health care organi-
zations that often are large enough to be self-insured (perhaps with
.'catastrophic" insurance for awards over $10 million). Even if
smaller hospitals become part of an insurance pool, they are likely
to generate sufficient claims-experience to warrant sizable variations
in premiums charged, depending on the institution's comparative
success in reducing its rates of compensable patient injuries.
Under a no-fault regime, the defendant hospital would still be
responsible for all negligent injuries suffered by patients-that is, for
all cases in which the incident would have been avoided had the in-
dividual doctor, nurse, or technician taken the necessary precaution.
With respect to this subset of patient injuries, the no-fault program
would not only retain, but even accentuate, present legal incentives
for reasonable medical care. As observed above, a no-fault liability
program avoids most of the financial dilution produced by insurance
against fault-based medical liability. In addition, the program's
greater accessibility would increase the number of patient claims
lodged for negligent medical injuries that are now too difficult to
bring, irrespective of tort law's formal doctrines.
No-fault also casts its net much farther to encompass legally
blameless accidents that are larger in number than those due to the
identifiable fault of some provider. One might ask what preven-
tive-as opposed to compensatory-value is achieved by imposing
liability for a medical injury that could not have been avoided by
currently reasonable precautions. The answer is that no-fault liabil-
ity assumes a dynamic perspective on the medical accident problem,
whereas malpractice law focuses only on procedures and precau-
tions that the medical profession has already adopted, given the cur-
rent state of the art. The practice of medicine is constantly evolving
under the impetus of newly developed diagnostic and treatment
techniques. Many iatrogenic injuries that were accepted as inevita-
ble just a decade or two ago-heart-block during cardiac surgery,
for example-are now considered avoidable as a matter of course.
The vital preventive role of a no-fault system is to add a legal spur to
existing incentives to undertake research and innovation in safer,
more advanced medical techniques in these settings. And in the
meantime, incorporating the cost of medical accidents in the price
charged for particular modes of treatment will permit a more in-




formed judgment by the health care system of the net value of this
treatment as compared with others that, while less promising, are
also less hazardous.
There is a subtle but important difference in the way that no-
fault and fault-based liability motivate medical-care providers to de-
liver safe and high quality care. A no-fault program leaves it to hos-
pitals and other health care organizations to decide whether it is
worthwhile to invest in particular safety precautions, or whether in-
stead to bear the financial cost of risks that are currently judged not
reasonably preventable. Because the health care provider must pay
for unavoidable injuries that still do occur, it faces a continuing fi-
nancial incentive to seek and adopt safer modes of treatment as
these become feasible. By contrast, under the fault system, a jury
scrutinizes the specific quality of treatment that happened to be ren-
dered by the individual doctor involved in the case, and decides
whether to issue a verdict of poor professional performance. Critics
of no-fault worry that byjettisoning the public stigma of malpractice
litigation, with its significant and noninsurable reputational losses,
that doctors no longer will have a legal motivation to avoid substan-
dard patient care.
After spending five years absorbed in an empirical study of
medical negligence and medical injury that documented the fact that
there is one tort for every 100 hospitalizations, I am convinced that
we would be better off without the dramatic morality play of tort
litigation. The tort-fault model fuels the popular but mistaken im-
pression that the solution to the medical injury problem consists of
finding and holding accountable a few bad apples in the medical
profession. To the contrary, most of the negligence identified in
hospital records, and most of the negligence that surfaces in the tort
system, consists of momentary inattention and inadvertent slip-ups,
rather than deliberate scrimping on the quality of patient care to
serve the personal interests of doctors or nurses.97
The deeper source of medical hazard is modern medicine's am-
bitious efforts to cure the even greater hazards of modern life.
Many of today's procedures are risky precisely because they are so
complex and so invasive. Imagine that doctors can now perform
surgery upon fetuses in utero to prevent what would otherwise be
severe and untreatable defects after birth. But no matter how so-
phisticated medical procedures and technologies may become, pa-
tients ultimately must rely on the care and attention of human
97. WEILER II, supra note 1, at 138.
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beings. As we all know from our experience in driving cars, human
beings are prone to let their minds wander, to make mistakes, and to
fail to notice dangers. So, too, in medicine, we can never program
out all human frailty from even the most highly trained doctors,
nurses, and technicians. Unlike the comparatively safe environment
of the highway or the workplace, the hospital-especially in its oper-
ating room-is a hazardous and unforgiving environment. Even
surgeons and obstetricians, who concentrate on their work far more
rigorously than most people, including lawyers, occasionally will
have a momentary lapse of attention. That mistake-which may
constitute negligence in the eyes of the law-can have tragic conse-
quences (including stressful litigation) when it occurs during a deli-
cate surgical procedure, such as the removal of a tumor from inside
the patient's brain or beside his spinal cord.
Recognition of these facts should make us more understanding
of the situation of those charged with negligence in the world of
modern medicine. Nevertheless, empathy is no reason to relax the
pressure that legal liability exerts for necessary levels of concentra-
tion and care. It does suggest, however, that a better mode of liabil-
ity is one that obligates the health care organization to pay for
patients' injuries, however they occur, and thereby gives the organi-
zation a continuing opportunity and incentive to learn how such in-
juries occur and how best to avoid them.9 8 Institutional memory
can help piece together patterns displayed in a host of apparently
idiosyncratic incidents. If the record discloses a tendency towards
erratic behavior on the part of doctors, nurses, and other hospital
staff involved in these cases, a hospital can take the steps necessary
to improve these providers' performance-or terminate their roles
in the institution. (And, unlike a tort award, the suspension of a
doctor's valuable hospital admitting privileges is a financial loss
against which a doctor cannot insure.) Alternatively, the sequence
of injuries may turn out to be primarily attributable to the normal
routines or facilities of the institution-the absence of systems that
monitor oxygen levels for patients under anesthesia; diagnostic and
treatment mistakes made in the emergency room by residents near
the end of continuous, thirty-six-hour shifts; or the failure of hospi-
98. Organizational medical liability is a proposal that I first made in WEILER I, supra
note 1, at 122-32, and in 2 ALl REPORT, supra note 1, ch. 4. Ken Abraham of the Univer-
sity of Virginia Law School and I currently are engaged in a project to work out all the
details that are crucial for implementation of this proposal that, as this Article was going
to press, President Clinton's Health Care Task Force was considering whether to en-
dorse as its key medical-liability reform.
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tal records or communication systems to transmit crucial informa-
tion to the various providers involved in treatment of the same
patients. To the extent such systemic failures are the major causes
of medical accidents-as I believe they are-the role of a no-fault
organizational liability is to prod hospitals to pool their collective
staff wisdom in devising procedures and technologies that minimize
the ever-present risk of occasional human failure, rather than simply
to single out for blame those individuals whose mistakes happen to
inflict the serious patient injuries that are likely to surface in the
courtroom.9 9
This shift in the focus of legal liability from the personal fault of
the individual doctor to the collective responsibility of the health
care association has a clear affinity with important institutional
changes that are now taking place within the health care system it-
self-"total quality management" as the vehicle for enhancing the
quality of medical treatment, and "managed competition" among
institutional providers to try to control the nation's spiraling health
care costs. A favored cost-control target of physicians, pundits, and
politicians is the excessive defensive medicine supposedly induced
by spiraling malpractice litigation.'0 0
I noted earlier that such preoccupation with defensive medicine
is somewhat misguided. Careful research on this topic indicates that
while the cost of defensive medicine-totaling perhaps $20 billion a
year-may be twice the cost of direct malpractice insurance, this is
still only a tiny fraction of our more than $840 billion health care
bill.'' In addition, some of the defensive precautions induced by
the threat of suit likely reduce the incidence of medical injuries,
thereby saving not only the lives and well-being of patients and their
families, but also saving the health care system the sizable extra cost
of treating medically injured patients. On the other hand, I am sat-
isfied that a considerable proportion of the extra tests, records, and
time used by doctors fearful of litigation is unproductive; indeed,
some of the additional procedures-for example, Caesarean-section
rather than normal deliveries-may actually pose greater medical
risks to patients, even if they reduce the legal risks of physicians.
99. For the best example of the preventive value of organizational liability, see John
H. Eichhorn et al., Standards for Patient Monitoring Duing Anesthesia at Harvard Medical
School, 256 JAMA 1017 (1986) (reporting on the process used to balance doctors' auton-
omy with the goals of improving patient care by mandating detailed standards for mini-
mal patient-monitoring during anesthesia).
100. See WEILER II, supra note 1, at 174 n.14.
101. See supra notes 10, 37 and accompanying text.
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Some of the key features of the tort-fault liability model-those
that would be altered in the no-fault liability model-are especially
conducive to wasteful defensive medicine. The focus of malpractice
litigation is whether, in an individual case, the doctor failed to fol-
low the steps and procedures that are accepted within the profes-
sion, not whether the doctor's mode of practice produces better or
worse outcomes for patients over the general run of cases. Doctors
feel strong psychological aversion to being sued and having cases
come to trial where their professional reputations may be publicly
blackened. They have a strong personal incentive, then, to utilize
the full catalogue of medical precautions to create a dossier
designed to protect providers from suit, irrespective of whether
these steps protect patients from harm. Because doctors make the
vast bulk of treatment decisions on behalf of those patients whose
extensive health care insurance leaves little room for consumer
resistance against unnecessary but expensive tests and procedures,
the cumulative result is likely to be sizable social expenditures upon
unproductive medical precautions.
No-fault medical liability would substantially alleviate these
misplaced legal incentives. The fact that the target of liability is the
health care institution, rather than the individual practitioner, would
remove much of the emotion and risk-aversion felt by doctors decid-
ing what treatment steps to take with their patients. In addition, the
fact that the basis of liability for the organization is the outcome, not
the process, of treatment-that is, whether the patient actually suf-
fered a medical injury, not whether the injury was produced by doc-
umented provider mistakes-means that there would be no legal
payoff from adopting treatment measures that only reduce the odds
of doctors being sued without reducing the odds of patients being
hurt.
I do not mean to overplay the ability of liability reform to re-
duce medical costs. As stated earlier, determining whether a partic-
ular patient outcome was caused by an omission in medical
treatment-for example, a failure to detect breast cancer in time-
implicitly rests on a judgment of physician fault, thereby creating
some incentive to perform unnecessary diagnostic tests and proce-
dures. Reinforcing that physician incentive is the fact that such
practices not only reduce lawsuits, they also increase physician in-
comes. (More tests and elaborate procedures mean higher billings.)
Nevertheless, if one includes organizational no-fault liability within
new models of health care cost-containment, the bulk of unjustified
medical expenditures generated by fears of litigation should be
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weeded out in the long run. That prospect reinforces the observa-
tion I made earlier-that no-fault liability not only delivers better
compensation and prevention to patients, but is affordable by the
public that now pays for the existing malpractice system.
VI. ELECTIVE No-FAULT
In this Article, I have not considered a radically different ap-
proach to medical injuries:102 a scheme that would assign responsi-
bility for compensating past injuries to first-party loss insurance and
leave prevention of future injuries to administrative safety and
health regulation. Whatever may be the prospects for health insur-
ance, it will be decades, at least, before this country ever adopts
comprehensive social insurance for earnings lost as a result of disa-
bility, and I am dubious about the injury-prevention potential of ex-
ternal regulation of the competence and performance of health care
providers. 10 3 For the foreseeable future, then, we will need to em-
ploy a liability model that supplies a measure of both compensation
and prevention to fill the gaps left by these other programs. And for
the reasons I have developed at some length, the no-fault version of
medical liability should be taken seriously in the ongoing debate
about this topic.
This is not to imply that we should sweep away the existing mal-
practice system and mandate full-blown no-fault liability across the
board. There is enough force to the various concerns I have ad-
dressed about medical no-fault liability to make policymakers under-
standably reluctant to take such a fateful leap in the dark.
Fortunately, there is an intermediate step: enacting legislation that
would facilitate adoption of the no-fault model on an elective ba-
sis. 10 4 Indeed, precisely that same path was followed early in this
102. The major scholarly figure who advocates this approach is Stephen Sugarman.
For his broader analysis, see STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY
LAW (1989). For his thoughts about medical injuries in particular, see Sugarman, supra
note 46, at 1521-24.
103. See WEILER I, supra note 1, at 107-13 (addressing various reasons why regulation
will not ensure physician competence).
104. See Jeffrey O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault
Insurance for Many Kinds of hIjuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 501 (1976) (advocating, as early as
1976, elective medical no-fault insurance). See also Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Ori-
gins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775 (1982) (re-
counting the early years of workers' compensation). Interestingly, the Swedish no-fault
program was adopted voluntarily by its health care system, and still rests on a contrac-
tual basis. This has afforded the program the flexibility to adopt a variety of decision-
making rules applied in difficult, recurring cases, for example, rules for deciding when
infections should be treated as iatrogenic. See sources cited supra note 18.
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century during the gradual emergence of no-fault workers' compen-
sation liability for occupational injuries.
The ideal scenario involves federal legislation containing the
following ingredients:
* Hospitals and other health care organizations would
be explicitly empowered to offer their patients administra-
tive compensation for medical injuries in return for patient
waiver of the common-law tort liability of the hospital and
its affiliated providers.
* Legislation would require that benefits payable meet
certain standards of generosity, including full coverage of
out-of-pocket medical expenses (that is, those expenses not
covered by direct insurance), eighty percent of net lost
earnings up to 200 percent of the state's average earnings
level, plus a specified payments schedule for loss of enjoy-
ment of life associated with certain physical impairments.
* Federal legislation is required to permit such medi-
cal no-fault liability to operate as second payor to first-
party loss insurance by removing existing indemnity rights
of loss insurers such as Medicare, Medicaid, and private
carriers or self-insured employers.'° 5
* The claims administration procedure would meet
acceptable standards of accessibility, neutrality, and due
process, and would authorize a designated-compensable-
events panel to develop DCE criteria that specify many of
105. There are legal roadblocks to state legislatures removing indemnity rights of
either federally-funded health insurance under Medicare or Medicaid, or private health
and disability insurance provided by self-insured employees covered by ERISA law. See
cases cited supra note 65. But see Bobbitt et al., supra note 16, at 866-88 (describing how
a state no-fault statute might be worded to finesse the obstacles posed at least by Medi-
care and Medicaid).
Removing the indemnity right of public and private insurers is indispensable if we
are going to make medical liability insurance a secondary payor. A patient's no-fault
entitlement could not be reduced by the amount payable under first-party health or disa-
bility insurance if carriers providing the latter coverage retain their rights to recover
these loss payments from the patient's liability award. This secondary-carrier feature of
medical no-fault is essential for two reasons. First, the program is made affordable
within the financial and political envelope provided by current malpractice expenditures.
Second, it eliminates the need to expend a considerable amount of administrative re-
sources on determining the causal link between the medical injury and disability-a task
that would be especially troublesome in the case of elderly patients whose principal fi-
nancial losses are medical costs already covered by Medicare. It is hard to imagine any
principled objection that can be lodged by health insurers against removal of their in-
demnity rights. It is the health-insurance system that ultimately pays the cost of the
more-expensive-to-administer medical liability system-whether as present-day fault-
based liability or proposed no-fault liability.
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the medical injuries that would-or would not-be
covered.
* The program would cover all medical injuries in-
flicted on the hospital's patients, even those caused by non-
employee doctors with admitting privileges, and even those
caused by diagnostic or treatment decisions made in the
doctors' offices. Doctors with admitting privileges in more
than one hospital would designate one such institution as
their principal practice site for purposes of liability for in-
jury to patients who were never admitted to any hospital.
* Appropriate adjustments would be made in the rev-
enues received for their services by all participants, both in
fees paid to the hospitals shouldering this new, no-fault lia-
bility, and to the doctors being relieved of personal tort
liability. Until and unless revisions are made in the reim-
bursement schedules of the variety of health insurers, these
cost adjustments would take the form of direct agreements
between the hospital and its medical staff about how to re-
allocate the payments received by each for risky procedures
such as obstetrical deliveries.
* The health care facility would have to operate an ef-
fective quality-assurance program that would include inter-
nal measures to hold accountable those providers
responsible for undue numbers of medical injuries that
surface through this claims process. Federal legislation
would address the question whether immunity from anti-
trust liability would cover the doctor-members of hospital
peer-review committees that recommend suspension of
practice privileges of accident-prone colleagues. tO6
* Before patients are invited to decide whether to ac-
cept medical care under no-fault auspices-or to choose in-
stitutions and doctors still governed by the existing
malpractice regime-the patients would have to be fully in-
formed in easily comprehensible terms of both the tort
rights they were surrendering and the no-fault benefits
they would be eligible to receive.
* Providers would have full immunity against tort
claims lodged not only by patients who choose to accept
treatment within this no-fault regime, but also by third par-
ties-such as the patients' family members suing for loss of
consortium or drug manufacturers seeking contribution for
tort suits brought by patients against them. Health care
106. Peer-review is currently immune from antitrust scrutiny only if a state has
adopted peer-review conduct as "state action," thus exempt from antitrust liability. See
Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 105-06 (1988).
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providers, in turn, would have no right to recover no-fault
benefits paid to injured patients through subrogation
claims lodged against outside parties who may have con-
tributed to the patients' disabilities.' 0 7
This scenario for reform offers several important advantages.
Obviously it is much easier to offer doctors and their patients a
choice about no-fault, a choice made under carefully tailored pro-
tection, than to convince the general public-including the medical
and legal communities-to mandate no-fault for everyone. Next,
elective no-fault affords us the chance to learn from the experience
of pioneer institutions blazing this trail: to observe, for example,
whether these institutions specify one kind of designated event as a
compensable injury, or treat a certain type of fringe benefit (for ex-
ample, lost employer-contributions to a pension plan) as compensa-
ble earnings. Finally, careful scientific study of such demonstration
no-fault projects, monitored as they operate side-by-side with the
tort-fault system, would enable everyone to gain a realistic apprecia-
tion of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of each,
before government is asked to decide that one regime is so far supe-
rior that it should be established as public policy for everyone.
Judge-made and judge-mandated malpractice law has never had to
pass such a test of how well it satisfies the needs of either patients or
doctors.
CONCLUSION
No-fault is not an easy and ideal cure for all the ailments of legal
liability.'"8 No such cure-all is possible, precisely because of the va-
107. For an extended analysis of the problem of overlapping no-fault liability of
health care providers and continued fault-based liability of the manufacturers of pre-
scription drugs, suppliers of medical equipment, or other third parties that may be in-
volved in patient injuries, see WEILER I, supra note 1, at 145. In addition to the list of
huge malpractice awards referred to in note 32, supra, the largest jury verdict in 1991
was a $127 million verdict rendered in a Chicago suit by a patient who was blinded in
one eye when injected with a manufacturer's drug by his ophthalmologist. See Charles
Mount, Injured Man Awarded $127 Million from Upjohn, Cm. TRIB., Oct. 19, 1991, at BI.
Essentially the same problem has been faced for many decades in the occupational in-
jury area, which is covered by both employer-provided workers' compensation and tort
liability of third-party manufacturers of workplace products. The proposal in the text-
which would make tort liability the tertiary insurer of medical injuries, standing behind
no-fault liability and first-party loss insurance-is the one I have also advocated for occu-
pational injury. See Paul C. Weiler, Wlorkers' Compensation and Product Liability: The Interac-
tion of a Tort and Non-Tort Regime, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 825 (1989).
108. Indeed, workers' compensation, our principal example of no-fault liability, has
itself become the object of business concern and legislative reaction in numerous states,
with total employer costs doubling since the mid-1980s. See Burton, supra note 8, at 1-2.
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riety of constituencies whose needs and concerns must be accom-
modated. Such a divergence of interests exists even if one is
inclined-as I am-to downplay the interests of doctors and lawyers
in redesigning medical liability, and to concentrate principally on
the needs of patients. The "patient" constituency is itself divided
into three distinct groups. One is made up of patients who have
already been injured as a result of past medical treatment and who
want adequate and accessible compensation for their losses. A sec-
ond consists of patients who are about to have treatment for their
illnesses and want effective prevention of avoidable injuries. A third
is comprised of people who, knowing they will be patients at some
time in the future, are paying now for health insurance that funds
the overall medical-care system-and who thus want these compen-
sation and prevention functions of medical disability insurance pro-
vided with as much economy and as little waste as possible. There is
no easy way to blend these competing values into a single liability
system. But when one compares the promise of medical no-fault
with the performance of malpractice litigation, the no-fault alterna-
tive has more than enough merit to justify its availability as a legal
option. Hopefully the necessary legislation will be in place to facili-
tate design and use of this option by the time the nation is en-
veloped in yet another malpractice crisis-likely in the mid-
1990s.'i 9
ADDENDUM
After this Article was written, Professor Jennifer Arlen authored
an extended commentary on the pieces prepared for this sympo-
The article by Professor Gary Schwartz in this Symposium reinforces in my mind the
need to use the elective approach to allow individual health care institutions to work out
the crucial details of benefit eligibility and administration before a legislature presumes
to mandate such no-fault coverage across the board. See Gary T. Schwartz, llWaste, Fraud,
and Abuse in Workers' Compensation: The Recent California Experience, 52 MD. L. REV. 983
(1993). Ironically, the largest factor in rising workers' compensation costs is soaring
expenditures by the health care system in treating injured employees-now constituting
more than 40% of workers' compensation payments. For a revealing study that helps
explain why, see Alex Swedlow et al., Increased Costs and Rates of Use in the California llork-
ers' Compensation System as a Result of Self-Referral by Physicians, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1502
(1992). I should also note that in executive sessions I have helped organize at Harvard
over the workers' compensation crisis, the one point agreed upon by all parties-em-
ployers, unions, insurers, doctors, and lawyers-is that they did not want to dispense
with the administrative no-fault model, and revive litigation about employer (and em-
ployee) fault for workplace injuries.
109. See Walter Wadlington, A Medical Malpractice Crisis in 1995 ?: Some Conceivable Sce-
narios, 36 ST. Louis U. LJ. 897 (1992).
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sium." ° I have not altered my text to address the numerous
thoughtful suggestions that Professor Arlen makes regarding the
proper design of no-fault medical liability. However, I shall use this
addendum to state my reactions to one of her key critiques. (The
reader may wish to postpone reading this until after reading Profes-
sor Arlen's article.)
Professor Arlen and I share the view that the law's objective
here is to secure an optimal blend of medical injury prevention and
patient compensation while containing the costs of administering
the liability program (including defensive and wasteful reactions by
both doctors and patients to the presence of such a program).
Within the existing tort regime, a key source of tension among these
objectives is its treatment of payments made by collateral insurance
sources. From the point of view of patient compensation, the most
sensible step is to offset these first-party payments against any third-
party liability award. However, Professor Arlen is legitimately con-
cerned that the resulting diminution in hospitals' expected liability
will reduce their incentive to prevent medical injuries happening in
the first place. Thus, she sketches an elaborate scheme under which
hospitals would bear all the costs of patient injury, but patients
would collect only their actual pecuniary losses.
The simplest reason why in this context I favor, instead, collat-
eral source offset is that this programmatic feature is the only basis
upon which medical no-fault could possibly be entertained in the
political arena. The Harvard Study found that if one made no-fault
liability pay for the already-insured-against losses from all iatrogenic
injuries, the program's costs would exceed those of present-day
malpractice litigation by an order of magnitude-a step that in the
current environment is simply unthinkable. Thus, those who agree
(as I think Professor Arlen does) that medical no-fault is preferable
to present-day tort-fault will have to accept this collateral source off-
set feature as well.
There are a number of practical reasons why we should not
consider that political reality to be intolerable from the point of view
of public policy. One reason is that the collateral source offset rule
has been adopted by a growing number of legislatures to contain
the size of malpractice recovery in individual cases, without ex-
panding the range of this liability program at all. A second reason is
the fact that the costs borne by the hospital from administering this




more accessible no-fault system-paying not just their own, but also
their patients' legal bills-itself offsets some of the savings derived
from the fact that most of the patient's direct injury costs are cov-
ered by first-party (largely health) insurance. Finally, if there were
to be a sharp increase in the magnitude of hospitals' expected liabil-
ity, so also would there be an increase in the tendency of hospitals to
obtain liability insurance against that risk-thereby deflecting much
of the incentive effect that might be derived from Professor Arlen's
suggested expansion in legal liability.
Theoretical analysis is valuable in identifying the key issues that
must be addressed in any legal reform. But the goal of liability re-
form is not to achieve a perfectly precise allocation of accident costs
to responsible actors. That is a goal that can only be achieved in
theoretical analysis. In the real world of medical liability, the law's
aim should be to send out a meaningful enough signal to get the
attention of those parties who are in a position to accomplish tangi-
ble improvements in the safety and quality of medical care. On that
score, I believe that hospital-based, no-fault liability fares quite well,
especially by comparison with the existing doctor-based, fault-ori-
ented malpractice regime.
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